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Abstract
Low latency anonymous network systems, such as
Tor, were considered secure against timing attacks
when the threat model does not include a global ad-
versary. In this threat model the adversary can only
see part of the links in the system. In a recent paper
entitled Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor, it was shown
that a variant of timing attack that does not require a
global adversary can be applied to Tor. More impor-
tantly, authors claimed that their attack would work
on any low latency anonymous network systems. The
implication of the attack is that all low latency anony-
mous networks will be vulnerable to this attack even
if there is no global adversary.
In this paper, we investigate this claim against
other low latency anonymous networks, including
Tarzan and Morphmix. Our results show that in con-
trast to the claim of the aforementioned paper, the at-
tack may not be applicable in all cases. Based on our
analysis, we draw design principles for secure low la-
tency anonymous network system (also secure against
the above attack).
Keywords: Low latency, anonymous, timing attacks,
Tor, Tarzan, Morphmix
1 Introduction
Anonymous communication systems were first intro-
duced in the seminal paper of Chaum (Chaum 1981).
Conceptually, a message to be anonymized is relayed
through a series of nodes called mix nodes. Each mix
node performs operations that have two main objec-
tives. The first one is to provide bitwise unlinkabil-
ity and is aimed at message content, and the second
one is mixing that is aimed at message flow. To pro-
vide unlinkability messages are padded and encrypted
so that the adversary cannot see the content of data
packets and so cannot link the content. In each node
incoming message is batched and reordered or relayed
in a way that is difficult for the adversary to discover
its corresponding outgoing message through the mes-
sage arrival and departure times. Also, to make the
attack more difficult, dummy traffic is introduced.
Anonymous communication systems over the In-
ternet can be classified into two categories: systems
for high-latency applications and systems for low-
latency applications. High latency applications are
application that do not demand quick responses, such
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as email systems. On the other hand, low latency ap-
plications are applications that do need real-time or
near real-time responses. Examples include web ap-
plications, secure shell (SSH) and instant messenger.
Both systems are built based on Chaum’s idea. Un-
linkability is provided in a similar way in both cases
using a sequence of nodes between a sender and its
receiver, and using encryption to hide the message
content. An intermediate node knows only its prede-
cessor and its successor.
High-latency systems are message-based systems
while, low-latency systems are connection-based.
That is, for high-latency systems there is one mes-
sage per one path, and for a new message a new path
is created. However, low-latency systems use a path
for a period of time and send data as a stream of
packets over the same path.
Another difference between the two is due to the
time restriction. Anonymous systems for low latency
applications may ignore the mixing process that in-
cludes batching and reordering, hence, they would be
more susceptible to traffic analysis attacks and in par-
ticular timing attacks. Timing attacks can be as sim-
ple as comparing the difference between the time that
packets enter and leave a network, with the time for
traversing a route. Timing attacks can be more com-
plex and include extracting traffic patterns of links
and comparing them to determine a route. In this
paper, we concentrate on the second approach.
The timing attack in (Danezis 2004, Levine, Re-
iter, Wang & Writght 2004) uses the fact that each
node in the network introduces a different delay. The
delay can be used to guess the correlation between
the input links and output links of a node. An ad-
versary can observe links over time and by comparing
traffic patterns of all links, determine series of nodes
that have similar link patterns and are likely to form
a route. Using statistical methods, the adversary can
obtain information about the sender and the receiver
of a path, or at least the path itself. The attack can be
avoided by making the timing characteristic of each
link indistinguishable. This, however, requires an un-
reasonable amount of mixing operations and cover
traffic and hence, long delays. It is not a trivial task
to find the right balance between anonymity and de-
lay in these networks.
The aforementioned timing attack assumes a
global adversary, who can observe all links in the net-
works. Under a weaker threat model, i.e. excluding
the global adversary, most low latency networks, such
as Tor (Dingledine, Mathewson & Syverson 2004) can
be considered secure. In this weaker threat model,
the adversary is allowed to only observe a fraction of
the links. This is a plausible assumption considering
the systems are operated over public networks, such
as the Internet and so there is no assurance that the
timing attacks can achieve more than finding parts of
the routes with non-negligible success probability.
Recently, Murdoch and Danezis have shown a
low cost attack that can successfully “break” low
latency systems, and does not use a global adver-
sary (Murdoch & Danezis 2005). Their attack
is based on a traffic analysis attack proposed by
Danezis (Danezis 2004). In their attack, Tor’s pro-
vided anonymity can be broken by an attacker that
only has a partial view of the network or is one of the
Tor nodes. The attack works because Tor removes
the mixing operation that has been used in its earlier
version, and instead processes its input queues in a
round robin fashion. The Tor node is responsible for
receiving and forwarding each stream’s packets. A
corrupted Tor node can create connections to other
Tor nodes and so indirectly estimate other nodes’ traf-
fic volumes at each time. These estimates use the
difference in the latency of streams that are sent and
received back using those connections. As the traffic
volume or traffic load on each Tor node is a result of
the traffic load of all relayed connections on that Tor
node, the technique in (Danezis 2004) can be used
to estimate the traffic pattern of each node and utli-
mately a good estimate of the route. Authors noted
that their scheme can be applied to any anonymous
low latency systems. This significantly invalidates the
threat model used in many low latency anonymous
systems.
Our Contributions
We examine the attack proposed by Murdoch and
Danezis (Murdoch & Danezis 2005), and investigate
if it works for other low latency anonymity networks.
We note that Tarzan (Freedman & Morris 2002) and
MorphMix (Rennhard & Plattner 2002) work dif-
ferently from Tor. In particular, they both employ
peer-to-peer architecture, whereas Tor tends to rely
on dedicate servers. Also, Tarzan includes some mix-
ing operations and cover traffic, which does not exist
in Tor. Moreover, MorphMix allows an intermediate
node to select part of the anonymous path, whereas
in Tor, a Tor client chooses the whole path by himself.
Our analysis has two directions. Firstly, we focus
on the latency of the system, to verify whether it can
be used to represent the traffic load of each node.
Secondly, we look at the effectiveness of the attack on
different architectures and mechanisms. We will use
our analysis to provide design principles for building
secure low latency anonymity systems that do not
suffer from these types of attacks.
Organization of The Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we briefly describe the related works in
this area. In particular, we review the three existing
anonymous network systems, namely Tor, Tarzan and
Morphmix and highlight the differences among them.
In Section 3, we review the low cost attack on Tor
as described by Murdoch and Danezis (Murdoch &
Danezis 2005). We note that this attack is claimed to
be applicable in any low latency network systems. In
contrast to this claim, we provide a counter example
in Section 4 where the attack fails to be conducted.
In particular, we discuss the possibility of employing
this attack in Morphmix, and we show that the result
does not provide the required information as claimed.
In Section 5, we derive some necessary conditions re-
quired when building a secure low latency network
system. By adhering these necessary conditions, a
secure low latency network system can be built and
the resulting system will not suffer from the low cost
attacks. We also provide some related discussions to
highlight our results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Related Works
In this section, we will briefly review the three exist-
ing anonymous network systems, namely Tor, Tarzan
amd Morphmix.
2.1 Tor
Tor, the second-generation Onion Routing, is a
circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication
service (Dingledine et al. 2004). It is an improved
version of the Onion Routing. Onion Routing(OR)
is an overlay system that aims to provide anonymous
communication to applications such as web brows-
ing, instant messenger and secure shell. As the OR’s
designs have several flaws and limitations when be-
ing deployed, Tor has included several additional fea-
tures that OR does not provide. Some of them are
perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory
services, integrity checking, configurable exit policies,
and rendezvous point and hidden service. Tor also
removes features that are considered by its authors
as being unnecessary. These features are mixing,
padding and traffic shaping.
There are three entities: a Tor client, Tor servers
(Tor nodes), and a recipient. Logically, a Tor client is
a sender that wants to have an anonymous communi-
cation with its recipient. It is an Onion Proxy in OR.
Tor servers are intermediate nodes or Onion Routers
in OR. They are responsible for routing streams to
its next nodes in accordance to what the Tor client
instructs them. Like OR, Tor calls the last Tor node,
before a recipient, the exit node. The recipient does
not need to be a member of the Tor network. That is
because the exit node acts as a guardian between the
open world (recipients) and the Tor network.
Similar to OR, a Tor client selects a number of
Tor servers as members of a circuit (OR and Tor call
a path a circuit). Where OR restricts one circuit
for one TCP stream, Tor allows many TCP streams
to share the circuit. Circuits are constructed a priori.
The main responsibility of the Tor client is to set up a
circuit and establish common keys between the client
and all intermediate nodes. These keys are used later
when the client wants to send relay cells to its recip-
ient and vice versa. Tor fixes a circuit’s size to be 3
Tor server nodes. More details of circuit construction
can be found in (Dingledine et al. 2004).
When the client wants to send data to its recip-
ient anonymously, for example, when a user starts
browsing a website, streams of packets are divided
into fixed-sized cells. The Tor’s cell size is 512 bytes.
Then, they are wrapped layer by layer using session
keys derived from pre-negotiated common keys. This
is done in a way that when they are unwrapped by the
Tor server, the node is able to know merely its prede-
cessor and successor nodes. Unlike OR that provides
mixing processes, the incoming cells to the Tor node
are simply put into queues, processed and sent out in
a first come first serve fashion.
Tor Threats Model
An adversary’s goal is to observe both the initiator
and the recipient. Like all other practical low latency
anonymous systems, Tor does not provide any mech-
anisms to protect against a global passive adversary.
However, it is designed to prevent the system against
an adversary that has the following capacities:
• the adversary who can observe some fraction of
network traffic;
• the adversary who can generate, modify, delete
or delay traffic;
• the adversary who can operate onion routers of
his own;
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Figure 1: Tor architecture
• the adversary who can compromise some frac-
tions of onion routers.
Attacks using the network traffic can be classified
into two main categories: traffic confirmation attacks
and traffic analysis attacks. Each category consists of
both passive and active attacks. Traffic confirmation
attacks are attacks where the adversary uses a traffic
pattern to confirm his guess. For example, the adver-
sary suspects that Alice is talking to Bob. Passively,
he observes traffic at both Alice and Bob’s ends and
uses a pattern that obtained from timing or volume
of packets that enter and leave both ends to verify
his suspicion; or actively embeds timing signatures
into the traffic between these two nodes to force the
distinct patterns that can be recognized. However,
traffic analysis attacks are attacks that the adversary
learns which points in the network he should attack
by using traffic patterns. For example, the passive ad-
versary can observe the network edges and then uses
relationships in timing or volume of packets to cor-
relate traffic that enter or leave the network; or the
active adversary can insert a pattern into traffic that
can be detectable afterward.
Examples of the traffic analysis attacks that could
be mounted with Tor are as follows. The passive ad-
versary can use other externally visible user-selected
options such as timing of packets to correlate traf-
fics. The active adversary can replay traffic; or he
can choose to deny service to trustworthy routers and
move them to compromised router; or he can deny
services to users and see if traffic stops elsewhere.
Tor and Traffic analysis
Tor considers traffic confirmation attacks, such as
end-to-end timing correlation, outside their design
goal. Tor designers focus their threat model merely on
the traffic analysis attacks (Dingledine et al. 2004).
Since Tor does not include the global passive or ac-
tive adversary in its threat model, some traffic analy-
sis attacks, such as observing traffic pattern, can be
discarded. Dingledine and Mathewson (Dingledine
et al. 2004) provide more details on how Tor de-
fends other traffic analysis attacks. There are also
other aspects of attacks that are harmful to Tor,
namely attacks with directory service and rendezvous
points. However, they are outside the scope of this
paper. More details can also be found in (Dingledine
et al. 2004).
2.2 Tarzan
Tarzan is another low latency anonymous system,
which is also based on the Chaum’s mix concept.
Similar to other low latency anonymous systems, it
is aimed to provide anonymity for applications such
as web-application or instant messenger. Unlike Tor,
Tarzan is based on peer-to-peer architecture. Each
Tarzan node can be both a Tarzan client (the sender)
or a Tarzan relay. This is done to avoid end-to-end
timing analysis of an entry and exit nodes. That is,
any one can join and leave the network and all nodes
can be potential initiators. Tarzan provides peer dis-
covery by using a protocol based on the gossip-based
mechanism similar to the one in (Harchol-Balter,
Leighton & Lewin 1999). Due to the peer-to-peer
characteristic, an adversary can imitate himself as
many Tarzan nodes as he wishes. Therefore, Tarzan
is equipped with a mechanism to store peers in a way
that reduces a chance that a malicious node is se-
lected. This is done by hashing the node’s IP address
according to its subnet and categorizing its result into
levels.
The recipient in Tarzan does not necessarily have
to be a Tarzan node; it can be any node in the net-
work. Tarzan provides a mechanism to get through
it through PNAT. Tarzan claims that it is resistant
to the global adversary’s attack, that is achieved via
its cover traffic mechanism, known as mimic traffic.
To prevent an overwhelming network consumption,
Tarzan limits the mimic traffic of each Tarzan node
to merely with some of its peers.
To illustrate this, when joining the network, after
discovering all other peers, the Tarzan node selects a
number of nodes as its mimics. Then, when an anony-
mous connection is required, the next relay node must
be chosen from the node’s mimic list.
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Figure 2: Tarzan Architecture with mimics
When a Tarzan node a wants to have an anony-
mous connection with its recipient such as a web
server svr, assuming that the anonymous tunnel has
l + 1 length where l is a number of the nodes in the
tunnel, a selects its first hop from its mimic list, say
n1. Then, a asks n1 for n1’s mimic list (ln1). a
chooses the 2nd hop, from (ln1). Then, a repeats this
process until l hops. Finally, a chooses the last node
randomly from a’s peer database. This last node acts
as an exit node in Tor but Tarzan names it PNAT.
Therefore, the connections has the following path:
a → n1 → n2 → ... → nl → PNAT → svr. It is
important to note that PNAT is selected randomly
from all peers in the database not from nl’s mimic
list, otherwise numbers of available paths are limited.
Figure 2 illustrates Tarzan network’s architecture and
its tunnel connections. In this example, each Tarzan
node has approximately 6 mimics.
2.3 MorphMix
MorphMix (Rennhard & Plattner 2002, Rennhard
& Plattner 2004) is another low latency anonymous
system. Its main objective is to provide a practical
anonymous communication to the masses. It is based
on a peer-to-peer architecture. Similar to Tor, Mor-
phMix is a circuit-based mix system that makes use of
fix-length cells and layered encryption to establish a
circuit through other nodes. Cover traffic is removed
unless really required. The circuit, the first node, the
last node and the nodes in between are called the
anonymous tunnel, the initiator, the final node and
the intermediate nodes, respectively. Unlike Tor or
Tarzan, the intermediate nodes in MorphMix are not
entirely chosen by the initiator. Rather, MorphMix
allows each intermediate node to select its successor.
When an initiator node a wants to establish an anony-
mous tunnel, it selects the first intermediate nodes b
from its current neighbor list. Then, it establishes a
symmetric key between them. The shared key is used
for layered encryption. To extend the tunnel, a asks b
for a selection of nodes that should be used as its next
hop. b sends a a set of its recommended nodes chosen
from b’s neighbors. a then chooses one of them, for
example, node c. a appends c to b in the tunnel. A
symmetric key between a and c is created and then,
sends to c through b. To prevent b from being man-
in-the-middle attack, MorphMix introduces a witness.
The witness’s duty is to act as a third party during
the next hop selection process. It allows the initiator
a to establish a shared key with the appended node
c through b, without revealing c’s key information to
b or without b being a malicious node. Figure 3 is
cited from (Rennhard & Plattner 2002). It shows
how MorphMix selects the next hop with the wit-
ness’s help. Assuming that the connection between
the initiator a and b has already been established.
The complete procedure is illustrated as follows.
1. a selects a witness w from the set of nodes
it already knows. It then generates its half
of the key information DHa and encrypts
it with W’s public key together with the
nonce({nonce1, DHa}PuKw). Note that a nonce
is used against replay attack and s is a number
of nodes a wants b to offer. Due to DHa is en-
crypted with the w’s public key. b has no idea
what this information is.
2. After b receives the message, it sends the en-
crypted DHa ({nonce1, DHa}PuKw) to w with
its selection of nodes and their public keys
({ipc, PuKc, ipd, PuKd, ipe, PuKe}).
3. w has two tasks. First, it decrypts
{nonce1, DHa}PuKw to get DHa. Then, w
selects randomly node c as the next hop. Next,
it sends request for next hop to c. This includes
b’s information {ipb, PuKb} together with
a’secret to c.
4. c checks if it will accept the request. If so, it
sends ok-message back to w.
5. w signs a set of nodes that b selects together with
nonce1 and sends back to b with its chosen node
for the next hop put first after the nonce1 in the
signature. The signature is used as a receipt from
w to a.
6. b receives the message from w. It knows that its
next hop is c. It then generates an identifier(id)
that is used to identify the anonymous tunnel of
this link between b and c. Then, it sends this id
with the new nonce (nonce2) to c.
7. c replies b with its DH-exchange part with id.
 
Figure 3: MorphMix hop selections.
8. b sends to a c’s DH part and the signature of w
that consists of list of chosen nodes.
Unlike any other systems, MorphMix does not re-
quire that any MorphMix node must have knowledge
of all other nodes. Rather, MorphMix pays more at-
tention to collusion’s detection of malicious nodes.
3 A Low Cost Attack in Low Latency Anony-
mous System
In this section, we review a low cost attack on Tor as
described in (Murdoch & Danezis 2005). The term
low cost comes from the fact that the adversary re-
quires only a partial view of the network, i.e. being
one of the Tor nodes, to attack the Tor network. The
attack shows that the Tor system is vulnerable to a
variant of timing analysis attack, even though this at-
tack was claimed to be prevented in the original Tor
threats model. That is, the claim that traffic analy-
sis attacks on Tor cannot be done without a global
passive adversary is indeed false.
The attack, conceptually, takes advantage of a
seemingly unavoidable limitation of the low latency
anonymous system; that is time. The goal of the at-
tack is to infer which nodes are being used to relay
streams in the Tor circuit. This greatly decreases the
anonymity properties of Tor system. Experimental
results are conducted and presented to support the
theoretical attack. In the end, the authors further
claim that this attack should be applicable to any
low latency anonymous system, such as Tarzan and
MorphMix.
The Idea of The Attack
The idea comes from the known fact that delay cannot
be induced much in the low latency systems. Hence,
the timing pattern of packets should persist through-
out a circuit. Tor had survived the typical timing
attack because its designers believed that the global
passive adversary is hardly possible. It does not con-
sider this type of attacks in their threats model. The
low cost attack indeed disproves this argument and
shows that the initial design is still vulnerable to the
timing attacks’ variants. It is true that the adversary
cannot observe all links in the network and mount
attacks as described in (Danezis 2004). Nevertheless,
being one of the Tor nodes does not prohibit the ad-
versary to measure latencies between all the nodes
and itself. In particular, these latencies can be used
to infer to traffic volumes of the nodes that it is com-
municating. Since the traffic pattern of each node can
be obtained from its traffic volume, the adversary can
use the techniques described in (Danezis 2004) to do
further analysis. Then, he is able to infer which nodes
carry the similar traffic pattern. In other words, they
are the relay nodes in the same circuit.
The idea is supported by the Tor architecture. The
Tor node has given each connection its own buffer
and processes these buffers in a round robin fashion.
When the buffer has no stream, it simply ignores and
moves to process the next buffer. More importantly,
the mixing process has been removed from Tor due
to its designers’ doubts on capacity and practicality
(Dingledine et al. 2004). Hence, when a new connec-
tion is established; or when any existing connection is
removed; or when the traffics of the existing connec-
tions are changed, the traffic loads on the Tor node
is changed. This affects the responses that this Tor
node would have on connections with other Tor nodes
that are previously established and are still currently
working. Consequently, due to this same reasons, the
traffic loads of the other Tor nodes are changed as
well. Therefore, they can conclude that the change
of the traffic load on one Tor node affects other Tor
nodes that have connections to it. Hence, for nodes
that are on the same circuit, their traffic loads should
result in the same pattern of effects. Note that the
change of traffic load occurred from the Tor node’s
environments, such as its CPU load, is ignored.
Entities Involved
The adversary merely requires to be a member of the
Tor’s system. That is, being one of the Tor clients.
 
Figure 4: Low Cost Attack Model in Tor
This node is called a corrupt node or a probe node.
Attack Model
Conceptually, the attack works as follows.
• A corrupt Tor node establishes connections to
other Tor nodes in order to measure these con-
nections’ latencies.
• The corrupt Tor node keeps monitoring latencies
of all these connections during a reasonable time
period.
• The latencies values are used to estimate traffic
loads of the Tor nodes’ that the corrupt node
makes connection with.
• Traffic patterns are derived from the traffic loads.
• When the adversary has the traffic pattern of all
nodes, it can further mount an attack similar to
ones in (Danezis 2004, Levine et al. 2004).
To make their attack more powerful, a variant of the
attack is proposed. That is, a network server to which
a user is connected to, is corrupted. Thus, there is no
need to observe a connection to extract the traffic
pattern. The adversary can choose a traffic pattern
that is easily detected and sends its streams through
the corrupt server. The aim of the attack is to find a
path between a victim node and the corrupt server.
This greatly reduces the anonymity of the system to
be at the same level with a simple proxy. Finally,
it is claimed that the attack would work with other
low latency network systems, including Tarzan and
MorphMix.
In the next section, we will investigate this argu-
ment and show that the claim made in this paper is
only valid under some restricted conditions. Figure 4
and figure 5 illustrate the low cost attack model and
its procedure respectively.
4 Analysis of the Low Cost Timing Attack
against Tarzan and Morphmix
To perform this attack with other systems, we em-
ploy the same model as the one used by Tor. The ad-
versary requires at least two entities: a corrupt node
and a corrupt server. A corrupt node is changed to
a sender node in each particular system. That is,
a Tarzan client in Tarzan, and an initiator node in
MorphMix.
Next, a corrupt node needs to acquire a list of
all other nodes in the system. Then, it establishes
connections to these nodes so that it can monitor their
connections’ latencies. Connections are monitored for
a period of time. During that time, the corrupt server
keeps sending its traffic into the system. When the
monitoring period finishes, latency of each connection
is used to estimate the traffic load of that particular
node. Then, the traffic load is compared with the
server traffic. If it results in similarity, the node is
concluded as one of the intermediate nodes in the
path. When traffic of all nodes are compared, the
possible path(s) is/are derived.
Thus, the attack would be successful under the
following three conditions:
• Latencies received at the corrupt node indeed
represent traffic loads of the target nodes.
• The corrupt node must be able to know other
participants in the network.
• The corrupt node must be able to establish a
direct connection to all nodes it wants to monitor.
The attack is successful in Tor because the Tor
architecture satisfies these conditions. Firstly, due
to the fact that Tor removes mixing operations and
cover traffic, its timing characteristic is retained. This
is supported by the experiment result in (Murdoch
& Danezis 2005). Secondly, Tor provides a directory
service that a Tor client can acquire a list of all other
Tor servers. Third, there is no restriction to prohibit
At a corrupt node At a corrupt server
Preparation
Find a list of all other nodes Prepare target stream
({1, 2, ..., N}) (S(t))
Action
1. for i = 1 to N
make connection to each nodei;
2. for i = 1 to N
2.1 while t record send S(t)
latency of each nodei (L(i));
2.2 derive → T (i)
traffic load of nodei
2.3 compare T (i)
with the server traffic S(t)
2.4 if T (i) ≈ S(t) then
nodei is a relay in the path.
3. Obtain a path, for example,
node1 → node3 → node6
Figure 5: Low cost attack’s procedure.
the Tor client not to establish a connection to all Tor
servers.
4.1 Low Cost Attack in Tarzan
To investigate if the attack is applicable with Tarzan,
we will analyze what influences each condition has
provided to the system.
Latency
There are two differences between Tarzan and Tor
that should affect the latency. The first one is Tor
operates its queue in a round-robin fashion. Secondly,
Tor does not include mixing operations and cover traf-
fic. The case is different for Tarzan. Tarzan provides
a mimic mechanism. That is, even though Tarzan
does not mention how each Tarzan node manages its
incoming queues, Tarzan controls the rate of output
links according to the average rates of its input links.
When each link does not reach the rate it requires,
Tarzan inserts dummy data. Also, prior to sending
out its streams to output links, the Tarzan node does
some mixing and batching within each link’s outgoing
queue.
Then, the question is if this so-called mimic has
enough influence to destroy the timing characteristic
of each traffic stream. At this stage, it seems that
the only way to prove this statement is to conduct
an experiment in the same fashion as the experiment
conducted in Tor. Unfortunately, Tarzan does not
provide the test-bed that includes the mimic part.
We leave this as an open research question. For the
purpose of this analysis, we would treat the Tarzan
node operations as a black box and assume that tim-
ing signature is not destroyed. Hence, the comparison
between the attack on Tor and Tarzan is still fair.
Node discovering ability
A Tarzan node discovers other peers through a mech-
anism based on a gossip-protocol. Thus, each Tarzan
node can gather all information about all peers. What
seems to be a problem is Tarzan is based on peer-to-
peer architecture so that the number of nodes should
be huge and the network should be dynamic. Then,
whether it is possible that the corrupt node can moni-
tor all others’ node latency is dubious. However, since
we are merely concerned with the ability to know
other peers in the network, Tarzan is still considered
to satisfy this condition.
Connection Establishment ability
After recognizing all other nodes in the network, if
the corrupt node is able to establish a direct con-
nection with all nodes through an anonymous tunnel
in Tarzan network, then this will satisfy the third
requirement. Unlike Tor, Tarzan restricts its traffic
through merely its mimics. Therefore, when target
nodes are not mimics of a corrupt node, the corrupt
Tarzan node may not be able to make a one-hop con-
nection to each target node. When the connections
require more than one hop, the corrupt Tarzan node
cannot be sure about the correctness of the latency
it measures. Then, the traffic load may be interfered
by the other traffic load of the nodes in between the
connections. Up to this point, it seems that the low
latency attack may not work in Tarzan. Nevertheless,
the adversary is fortunate. Tarzan employs PNAT ,
which is the last node in the tunnel prior to the recip-
ient. Unlike other intermediate nodes in the tunnel
that their successors and their predecessors are re-
stricted to their mimics, the PNAT can be any node
in Tarzan network. Therefore, to measure latency of
other node in the network with a single hop connec-
tion, the corrupt node can treat each target node as
the PNAT of that connection. Then, there will be
no problem with the mimic traffic.
In summary, the low cost attacks should be ap-
plicable with the Tarzan architecture, unless Tarzan’s
mimic traffic can destroy timing characteristic of the
streams or the PNAT mechanism is modified to re-
quire the exit node to be part of the mimics.
4.2 Low Cost Attack in MorphMix
The major differences between MorphMix and Tor
seems to be the architectures of the systems and the
method to select tunnels’ members and the exit node.
MorphMix works in a peer-to-peer environment where
Tor has dedicate servers acting as Mix nodes. In Tor,
a Tor client is the one who selects all participants in
its anonymous tunnel by itself. However, a MorphMix
node selects its participants through suggestions of
each intermediate node in the tunnel. Tor does have
an exit node but MorphMix does not. We conduct
our investigation whether the low cost attack will be
applicable to MorphMix based on the same three cri-
teria mentioned earlier.
Latency
MorphMix nodes appear to work in the similar fash-
ion as Tor nodes, after tunnels are established. That
is, no cover traffic mechanism is included. Thus, in
this aspect, the attack should be applicable to Mor-
phMix.
Node discovering ability
There is no requirement in MorphMix that each Mor-
phMix node must have knowledge of all other Mor-
phMix nodes in the system. Simply, each node re-
quires a handful of other nodes obtained locally such
as from its neighbors. Then, when it wants to estab-
lish a tunnel, it continually asks each hop one at a
time to recommend a set of possible next hop. This
allows nodes in MorphMix system to create anony-
mous tunnels without concerning the knowledge of
all nodes in the system.
The implication is as follows. When the low cost
attack is employed, the corrupt MorphMix node has a
problem with acquiring a complete list of all running
MorphMix nodes. That is, it must discover all nodes
first. This is not a trivial exercise, in particular, when
the discovery can only be done through MorphMix
tunnel establishment mechanism. Therefore, an ef-
fective searching algorithm is required. Nevertheless,
this involves a lots of work. Hence, the so-called “low”
cost attack will now become “costly”. Also, by the
time all nodes are discovered, the list may be out-
dated, since some peers may have disappeared from
the network. Moreover, due to loose knowledge of
other nodes’ presences, there is no assurance that all
nodes in the MorphMix network are connected. In
this case, the attack cannot even be conducted.
Connection Establishment ability
There is no restriction in MorphMix connection.
Hence, each MorphMix node can have a one-hop con-
nection to other MorphMix node directly.
In short, the current attack is not applicable to
the MorphMix architecture because the corrupt node
is lacking the knowledge of a complete list of all Mor-
phMix nodes.
5 Design Requirements for Secure Low La-
tency Networks
There are two essential conditions required in mount-
ing the low-cost attack. Firstly, the knowledge of all
other nodes in the system by a corrupt node is es-
sential. Without this knowledge, this type of attacks
cannot be performed. Secondly, the latency being
probed must genuinely represent the traffic load.
Based on these observations, we derive the follow-
ing conclusions. There are two alternative approaches
that can be taken to prevent the low cost traffic analy-
sis attacks.
1. Preventing all nodes from gathering information
of the whole network , i.e. a list of all nodes. This
implies that we only need to provide adequate
information so that an anonymous tunnel can be
created.
2. Inserting cover traffic into streams in the network
in a way such that the network cannot find the
streams’ signature.
Based on either of these two possible approaches,
we can build a secure low latency network that will
not be susceptible against the low cost attacks.
It is important to note that all strategies suggested
by (Murdoch & Danezis 2005) fall into the second ap-
proach. However, as they introduce more latency to
each connection and involve a covert channel, there
remains an open problem in what degree that cover
traffic should be employed. Hence, the first alterna-
tive sheds a new light in preventing this attack.
Further Discussions
The significant part for anonymity preserving in a
low latency anonymous system appears to be in the
second scenario, that is, the message flow or traffic
flow. This is due to the main restriction of the sys-
tem, which is an intolerable long delay. When enough
delay is introduced, it distorts the relay node capabil-
ity to mix or make its incoming and outgoing streams
indistinguishable. This leaves some “clue” for the ad-
versary to finally break the anonymity of the system.
However, having multiple nodes in the anonymous
tunnel hardens the adversary in the sense that he
must be able to control all nodes or links. This group
of adversary is called global adversaries.
It seems rather difficult to provide anonymous low
latency systems that are both resistant to global ad-
versaries and provide acceptable delay for applica-
tions. Fortunately, it is not a trivial task to be the
global adversary in the Internet as the Internet hosts
are distributed around the globe under different do-
mains and authorities. Therefore, it is considered to
be reasonable to assume that a system is secure un-
der a weaker type of adversaries. These adversaries
are allowed to do several things both passively and
actively, such as observing some fractions of network
traffic or generating, modifying, deleting or delaying
traffic or operating some intermediate nodes; except
the requirement for observing all links.
Systems, such as Tor, claim that they provide
enough countermeasure against this type of attacks.
However, they have not considered that a variant of
the attack can be applied without having to involve a
global adversary. By taking advantage over the tim-
ing constraint and the removing of cover traffic, the
low cost attack has successfully attacked the weaker
threat model in Tor, and therefore, this model is re-
garded as insufficient.
According to our investigation with other systems,
which are Tarzan and Morphmix, the attack is con-
sidered to be valid to all low latency networks with
the requirement that the system must allow a node to
obtain a list of all other nodes in the network. Other-
wise, if this capability is prohibited, the weaker threat
model is acceptable.
Hence, for any anonymous low latency system that
wants to claim the weaker threat model that secures
against a timing attack, this condition must be en-
forced. Under this condition, each node is only al-
lowed to know a subset of neighbors, but not all of
them.
This can be used as another supportive reason
to favor peer-to-peer based systems over dedicated-
server based systems in designing a low latency
anonymous network. This is due to the fact that a
number of nodes in the peer-to-peer system is huge.
Thus, if an adversary manages to find all the nodes,
the list would be outdated as it is hard to obtain the
list of all nodes within a short time.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated one of the attacks in
low latency anonymous network systems, namely the
low cost traffic analysis attack. This attack is an im-
portant one, since it has proven to be successful in
attacking a system like Tor, which was believed to
be secure under the weaker threat model. Moreover,
these types of attacks are claimed to work with any
low latency anonymous systems. We presented a case
where this attack is not applicable. We also investi-
gate some important properties that need to be en-
sured whilst building low latency network systems, so
that they will not be susceptible against these types
of attacks. Hence, we provided some necessary condi-
tions that are important and need to be adhered when
designing the low latency anonymous networks. We
note that cautions must be exercised upon building
this type of networks.
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